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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Cette recherche se penche sur la demande d'assurance de la responsabilité civile des 
administrateurs et des dirigeants d'entreprise en utilisant des données pour plus de 350 
compagnies canadiennes entre 1993 et 1999. Les firmes dans les secteurs des services financiers 
et des mines ne sont pas inclues. Plus précisément, nous nous intéressons à la demande 
d'assurance de la responsabilité civile des administrateurs et des dirigeants. Nos résultats 
suggèrent qu'il est plus probable pour une corporation de grande taille d'avoir une assurance 
D&O que pour une corporation de petite taille. Les corporations qui ont une bonne santé 
financière ont moins de chance d'avoir une assurance, tout comme les corporations où la 
présence d'administrateurs indépendants au conseil d'administration est importante. De plus, plus 
les membres des conseils d'administration sont impliqués financièrement dans la santé d'une 
corporation, moins importante est la probabilité que cette compagnie possède une assurance 
D&O. Un résultat surprenant que nous obtenons est le fait que d'être enregistré dans une bourse 
américaine ne semble pas avoir d'impact sur la demande d'assurance D&O, contrairement aux 
études précédentes. 
 
This paper looks at the insurance demand of a firm's directors and officers using a sample of 
Canadian corporations (excluding firms from the Financial services and Mining sectors) from 
1993-1999. More to the point, we study the demand for director's and officer's insurance. Our 
results suggest that larger corporation are more likely to purchase D&O insurance. Firms that 
are strong financially are less likely to purchase D&O insurance. Firms are also less likely to 
purchase D&O insurance when there are many outsiders on the board of directors and when the 
board member have an important financial stake in the corporation. Surprisingly, being listed on 
a stock exchange in the United States does not seem to have an impact on the demand for D&O 
insurance, contrary to previous results. 
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1.1 Motivation
In the wake of the Enron debacle many pundits suggested that company managers may be faced
with more and more lawsuits by angry stakeholders who feel they are kept in the dark regarding
the company’s operations. Shareholders are arguably the most likely stakeholders to complain
about the management team in place, and they are more likely to do so when the situation is not
going well. On top of shareholder activism and new possible disclosure rules of the SEC, another
interesting aspect of studying D&O insurance is that it may shed light on why corporation purchase
insurance; one of the many puzzles found in modern ﬁnance theory.
Although it has been argued that progressive tax systems induce corporations to smooth earn-
ings, no earning insurance contract exists (at least not any that has a decent basis risk). In fact,
insurance is usually purchased to cover risks that are often uncorrelated with earning, which means
that insurance oﬀers earnings coverage with a large basis risk. Another aspect of the tax code,
the possibility to carry forward and carry back earnings, also puts a dent in the argument of taxes
to explain the purchase of insurance since ﬁrms can use these tools to smooth earnings over time.
A ﬁnal argument against the tax-reason for purchasing insurance is that we observe corporations
purchasing insurance even if the tax schedule is not progressive. Although insurance is only one
of the many hedging tools available to corporation, it is the oldest and it represents an important
economic sector in the United States as around 20 trillion dollars are paid in premiums every year
to cover commercial multiple peril risks. That is on top of the 30 trillion dollars paid by insur-
ers in worker’s compensation insurance and the 20 trillion dollars paid for other types of liability
coverages (including insurance for corporate directors and oﬃcers). These three insurance lines
represent about 20 % of the 340 trillion dollars paid in property and casualty insurance premiums
in the United States 2000. This is down from 27 % in 1994.
Researchers have argued that non-tradable human capital is a good explanation to insure. Given
that some stakeholders in a corporation such as workers and managers may have the great majority
of their human capital tied up in a given corporation, it becomes essential for such corporation to
oﬀer insurance in a way to attract and retain the best workers and the best managers. This fear of
ﬁnancial distress is also argued to be a good reason to hedge to calm consumer fears and supplier
fears that the corporation will be there in a few month either to oﬀer consumer services or pay for
1merchandises bought.
The type of insurance we want to look at in this paper is indeed linked to the argument that
a corporation must insure itself in order to attract and retain the best human capital within
the corporation. Although Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ insurance (D&O insurance) does indeed oﬀer
protection to managers of the corporation, it does so for strange events. D&O insurance protects a
corporation’s managers against liability lawsuits brought upon them as managers of the corporation.
In this sense, this is not too diﬀerent from other types of insurance. What is surprising, however,
is that most lawsuits a brought by stockholders against management. According to a study of
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999), lawsuits usually originate from shareholders (44%), employees
(29%) and clients (14%). We are then faced with shareholders who oﬀer managers as part of their
compensation package insurance against the possibility that shareholders will sue managers. D&O
insurance covers managers for their court expenses as well as for any settlement arising from the
lawsuit.
The goal of this paper is to present an analysis of the demand for D&O insurance for Canadian
corporations. The reason why we use Canadian corporations instead of U.S. corporation is that
Canadian corporation listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (Canada’s most important exchange)
have been required by law since 1993 to divulge information pertaining to their D&O insurance
coverage.
As representative of the corporation managers may be liable for some of their actions committed
in the name of the corporation. Directors are personally responsible for their actions. This means
that their own personal assets are at risk in the event of a lawsuit against the corporation and its
management.
D&O insurance is quite common amongst U.S. and Canadian public corporations. According
to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1998, 1999) the proportion of U.S. ﬁrms that had D&O insurance was
92% in 1998 and 93% in 1999. The proportion is a bit smaller in Canada where 84% of surveyed
corporation had D&O insurance in 1998, and 73% in 1999. The proportion of corporation with
D&O insurance has been rising in the nineties as only 81%o rU . S .ﬁrms had D&O insurance
coverage in 1992. This is a possible indication that D&O insurance is an important feature of the
compensation package of managers.
One possible reason why D&O insurance has become more and more popular is that lawsuits
against management are becoming more frequent. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999) reports that
2about 24% of U.S. public corporation (and 14% of Canadian public corporations) had to face
lawsuits related to the behavior of their management between 1989 and 1999. This proportion was
64% for U.S. corporations whose assets are worth in excess of 10 billion dollars. It appears clear
that D&O insurance is an essential element of corporate governance, and it is very much present in
the economy. One must then wonder what aﬀects the purchase of D&O insurance and its structure.
1.2 Relevant literature
It should be straightforward to see that if there is a market for D&O insurance it is because managers
are risk averse. Given that their own personal wealth is fair game when a suit is ﬁled against a
corporation and its representatives, and given that there is a probability that the corporation will
not be able to compensation the managers for their court expenses (or the required settlement),
mangers require that their personal wealth be insured if they are to manage a given corporation.
In place of insurance, managers may demand higher pay to compensate for the risk they are facing.
D&O insurance is therefore a risk management tool to manage the risk faced by risk averse managers
(sic!).
Few studies have been conducted on the demand for D&O insurance. This is mainly due to the
fact that information has not been available in any country prior to 1990.1 The Cadbury report
in the United Kingdom and the Dey report in Canada changed all that by recommending to their
respective securities commission to make available more information on the risk faced by publicly
traded corporation and the tools used to manage that risk. The reports also recommended that
more information be made available regarding managerial compensation. Given that the purchase
of D&O insurance is one part risk management tool and two parts managerial compensation,
corporations in the United Kingdom and in Canada were mandated to make public that information.
Core (1997) was the ﬁrst to use the newly available date on D&O insurance purchases by
Canadian companies. Using a sample of 222 ﬁrms whose ﬁscal year ended between 31 May 1994
and 31 December 1994, he ﬁnds that the most important determinants of D&O insurance purchase
is whether the risks of a lawsuit are high2 and whether the risks of ﬁnancial distress are high.
Although he ﬁnds signiﬁcant determinants of the corporate demand for D&O insurance, his overall
1The only information available prior to 1990 was collected by Wyatt and Associates (now part of the Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin group) via surveys.
2Romano (1991)a r g u e st h a tt h em o s ti m p o r t a n tf a c t o ru s e dt od e t e r m i n et h er i s ko faf u t u r el a w s u i ti sw h e t h e r
the corporation was sued in previous years.
3goodness of ﬁt is quite low. His model correctly predicts only about 34% of the ﬁrms that do not
purchase any insurance, versus 76% of the ﬁrms that do purchase insurance. Moreover, he cannot
ﬁnd any evidence that D&O insurance is in any way part of the overall compensation package
oﬀered to managers. Our study builds upon his approach by increasing the sample size and the
number of years used. In a following study, Core (2000) examines the premium paid by corporations
to insure managers. He ﬁnds that the factors explaining premium are about the same at the factors
explaining the demand for D&O insurance.
Using a sample of 366 corporations in the United Kingdom, O’Sullivan (1997) ﬁnds that the
factors that explained D&O purchase in Canada (Core, 1997) also explain D&O purchase in the
United Kingdom. He hastily concludes that D&O insurance coverage is used by large corporations
as an incentive tool for managers to work in the best interest of shareholders. He ﬁnds that the
manager share ownership and D&O insurance coverage seem to be corporate governance instrument
substitutes.
Earlier papers by Bhagat, Brickley and Coles (1987) and Janjigian and Bolster (1990) ﬁnd that
D&O insurance coverage does not seem to alter shareholder wealth nor returns. A similar result is
obtained by Brook and Rao (1994) who ﬁnd that corporations who make provisions for lawsuits do
not have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent stock returns than corporations who do not make any provisions.
There are many reasons why the study of D&O insurance is important. First, it remains an
unexplored territory, Few papers have been devoted to this aspect of corporate governance. Is
D&O insurance part of the compensation package, or is it a way to align the manager’s incentives
with those of the shareholders? Second, it gives us a further insight into the general corporate
demand for insurance. Why do ﬁrms hedge their risk given that it is more costly to them than
to shareholders? Finally, we are able to observe how presumably highly rational agents (i.e., the
managers) behave when faced with a possible catastrophic personal loss.
Our approach to corporate risk management issues is similar to that used by Mayers and Smith
(1982, 1987). Given that it is near impossible to obtain data on corporate risk management directly,
Mayers and Smith had to infer the behavior of corporation faced with the possibility of managing
risk indirectly. To do that they studied the demand for reinsurance of insurance companies. Our
approach looks at the behavior of directors and oﬃcers in choosing their insurance contract. Our
approach is logical is one may infer that the only reason ﬁrms manage risk is to reduce indirect cost
of going bankrupt. Indeed, without insurance employees, whether at the bottom of the pyramid of
4at the top, may not invest an optimal level of eﬀort in increasing their ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital.
Thus, by managing risk ﬁrms may reduce labor costs and/or increase productivity.
The setup of the paper is as follows. We ﬁrst present a short primer on D&O insurance. The
data and the theoretical predictions are presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the results. We
divided the result section into four parts. In the ﬁrst part, we determine the likelihood that an
agent will purchase D&O insurance. In the second and third part we ﬁnd the determinants of the
policy limit and deductible amount respectively. The fourth part of section 4 presents the case
where it is assumed that the policy limit and the deductible amounts are chosen simultaneously.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
1.3 A Primer on D&O Insurance
The environment in which directors and oﬃcers of a corporation operate may sometimes be ex-
tremely diﬃcult. As managers of the corporation, their ﬁd u c i a r yd u t ya sw e l la st h e i rb e h a v i o ra s
representatives of the corporation may be called into question by any stakeholder in the economy,
whether they are the corporation’s shareholders, employees, consumers or government agencies.
Not only can the corporation be liable for its behavior, its managers may also be personally liable.
This means that lawsuits may be brought upon the managers personally arguing that they did not
meet their ﬁduciary duty toward a stakeholder of the corporation. Although managers may have
made a mistake in good faith, the strict liability rule governing the ﬁduciary duty of managers does
not allow a good faith defense. To compensate managers for their legal fees and any loss they are
assessed corporations can either purchase D&O insurance coverage prior to the lawsuit, or use a
pay-as-you-go-like legal indemnization scheme (see Moreau, 1995). Our study focuses exclusively
on the insurance component recourse because the ﬁrm’s indemnization scheme may not be available
to managers in case of bankruptcy.
The D&O contract is purchased by corporations to protect their managers. The insurance
covers all expenses and losses incurred by a manager as the result of a lawsuit brought upon him
as a representative of the corporation. The insurance company indemniﬁes the corporation and/or
t h em a n a g e ro n l yi st h em a n a g e ra c t e di ng o o df a i t ho nb e h a l fo ft h ec o m p a n y . D e p e n d i n go n
the type of D&O contract, sometimes the manager will be indemniﬁed directly, other times the
corporation will be indemniﬁed for the expenses incurred in the manager’s defense (for example
when the corporation has its own in house legal team). As with other standard insurance contracts,
5D&O insurance contracts stipulate a premium to be paid, a policy limit as well as a deductible.
A particular feature of D&O insurance contracts is that it is written on a claim made and
reported basis, similarly to most professional liability insurance contracts. In contrast with occur-
rence contracts, claims-made contracts cover the policyholder for claims that are reported during
the policy year, no matter when the loss was incurred in the past, subject to a retrospective date
before which losses are not covered.3 Occurrence contracts cover the policyholder for losses that
are incurred during the policy year, no matter when the claim is reported in the future. According
to Doherty (1992), this diﬀerence in the two types of contracts is due to the increased uncertainty
in the liability rules. A consequence of the so-called liability crisis in professional liability insurance
of the late 70s and early 80s (especially medical malpractice insurance) induced insurers to create
organizations and contracts whereby part of the liability-rule risk was passed on the policyholder.
Doherty concludes that the emergence of mutual insurers and claims made contracts can be di-
rectly attributed to this liability rule uncertainty. Building upon Doherty (1992), Boyer and Gobert
(2002) assert that claims-made policies can also be used to separate good risks from bad risks, risk
averse agents from risk neutral agents and to smooth individual consumption over time.
An important feature of claims made contracts is that the insured’s past behavior is both a
signal for future losses as well as current claims. Observed past behavior then becomes a double
whammy; past behavior may not only be an indication of what behavior the insured will have in the
future, it also is an indication of the losses to be paid in the present because of such past behavior.
2E c o n o m e t r i c A p p r o a c h
2.1 Data Source and Sample
Our sample includes 354 Canadian corporations drawn from 8 economic sectors: biopharmaceutical,
forest and paper, industrial products, technological, consumer products, consumer and industrial
products, merchandising, and communication and media.4 Because of holes in the data, 27 ﬁrms,
mainly smaller ﬁrms were deleted from the start. There is no survivor bias as we collected data on
new companies as well as companies that disappeared during the sampled years. Because of this
incomplete panel, we have 1594 observations, which gives us an average of 4.9 years per company
3Typically insured either did not need insurance prior to the retro date, or they were covered under an occurence
insurance policy.
4Two very big sectors of the Canadian economy were deliberatly ommitted: Financial and Mining. We did that
in order to keep our sample more homogenous.
6(out of a maximum of 7). Of the 327 ﬁrms used in our ﬁnal sample, close to 60% have information
for 5 years or more, including 22% for all the years. 73.4% of the ﬁrms (241 ﬁrms) purchased D&O
insurance at least once during those seven years. Of the 327 ﬁrms, over 17% did not exist anymore
at the start of 2000. Table 1 in the appendix5 presents a detailed account of the number of ﬁrms
p e ry e a ri n c l u d e di no u rs a m p l e ,ﬁrms being divided by sector. One may refer to André, Boyer and
Gagné (2002) for more details on the database.
The proportion of ﬁrms in our sample that purchased D&O insurance increased from 61%i n
19 9 3t o7 0 %i n1998 and 75% in 1999. For the same years, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999) reports
that the proportion of U.S. corporations who purchased D&O insurance increased from 84% in 1993
to 92% in 1997 and 93% in 1999. In Canada, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999) reports that 84 %
of corporations purchased D&O insurance in 1998 compared to 73% in 1999 (no Canadian data is
available prior to 1998).
By law (see the statutes of the Ontario Securities Commission), all the information regarding
D&O coverage is available from the management proxies, along with details related to managerial
compensation and board composition. We obtained ﬁnancial data from three diﬀerent sources,
depending on the company: Compustat, Stock Guide and CanCorp Financial. Stock prices and
total returns are drawn form the TSE-Western tapes. All values are in Canadian dollars; any U.S.
dollar ﬁgure has been converted to Canadian dollar using the exchange rate at the ﬁscal year-end
of each company.
We collected precise information regarding executive compensation of publicly traded Canadian
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Since 1993 every company traded on the TSE
must make public a lot more information that was required previously. They also needed to divulge
information regarding 1991 and 1992 in order for the investor public to get an historical point of
view. This information is made public once a year in the management proxy (information circular).
The information contained in these proxies include 1) the name of the main stockholder; 2) the total
compensation package (base salary, bonus, number of common shares and call options received)
for the ﬁrm’s top-5 executives; 3) the number of exercised options and their value, as well as the
number and the value of vested and non-vested options; and 4) the board structure (name and
position) and the number of shares owned by each member. Management proxies also gives us the
details about the type of vesting rights the executives have, as well as the voting rights of each type
5All tables may be found in the appendix.
7of common shares.
Since 1996 all this information is available on the internet site of SEDAR (http://www.sedar.com/).
Prior to this date the information must be collected from the companies directly (for free allegedly),
or from Micromedia (at a price).
2.2 Variables Used
2.2.1 Director’s and Oﬃcers’ Insurance
Since 1993, corporations are required to state whether it purchased insurance to compensate their
directors and oﬃcers in case of a lawsuit brought upon them as a representative of the corporation.
Although corporations may have management legal indemniﬁcation schemes such that the purchase
of insurance is not required, such information is not available. We are constrained on using whether
insurance was purchased by corporations. Our dependent variable in this study is thus whether
D&O insurance was purchased or not. We will assign the value 1 to companies that state that they
do have D&O insurance and 0 otherwise.
Similarly to previous research on D&O insurance (Core, 1997, 2000, and O’Sullivan, 1997),
we have two classes of explanatory variables that are hypothesized to have an impact on the of a
corporation’s likelihood of having D&O insurance. The ﬁrst class is related to the corporation, the
second to the corporate oﬃcers and directors.
2.2.2 The Corporation
Starting with size, we feel that size should be important factor in determining whether a ﬁrm will
need insurance.6 We use two measures of size: The log of the assets (Assets), in millions of dollars,
and the log of the market value of equity (MVE), also in millions of dollars.7 Each measure has its
importance. The log of assets measures the importance of a ﬁrm’s operations. The greater the size
of a ﬁrm’s operations, the more likely it will need D&O insurance coverage because, for example,
it has more employees, more clients and more exposure. Also, operations of larger corporations are
harder to oversee by management because the chain of information is longer. The market value of
equity is also an important measure of size as it measure an aspect that is not completely measured
6One could also argue that larger corporations are more able to self-insure (see Stulz, 1996). Although one could
interpret this as saying that larger corporations are less likely to need insurance, the actual interpretation should
rather be that larger corporations are willing to increase the size of their deductible. The need for insurance should
not be reduced because of size.
7Of course we will correct for the high corelation between these two variables in the regressions.
8with assets: The exposure to litigation arising from shareholder losses. Given that almost half of
lawsuits originate from shareholders (presumably because they lost money), it becomes important
to measure that type of exposure. According to these arguments, larger corporations both in terms
of assets and equity are more likely to have D&O insurance.
To measure returns, we will also use two measures; the accounting measure of return on assets
(ROA) and the market measure of the volatility of the corporation’s stock return (Volatility). To
measure volatility, we used the annual volatility of compounded daily returns of the stock (see Hull,
2000). Although one could think that volatility would increase the likelihood of having insurance,
it is rather the opposite. Indeed, suppose that stock returns reﬂect both managerial qualities and
noise. If noise is an important aspect of returns, it may completely mask the impact of managerial
quality, which reduce the likelihood that a lawsuit will be successful. It follows that poor returns
may not be followed by lawsuits because such poor returns may not be a consequence of bad
managerial quality. Moreover, individuals who invest in high volatile stock know that low returns
are likely, which means that lawsuits are not automatic following a bad stock return. High volatility
would therefore decrease the need for D&O insurance. High return on assets should also decrease
the likelihood that a ﬁrm will purchase D&O insurance. Presumably, the higher the ROA, the more
likely shareholders will be happy, and clients and employees will feel safe with the company. We
calculated the ROA using the ratio of net earnings excluding extraordinary items to total assets.
The way in which a corporation is ﬁnanced should aﬀect the decision to purchase D&O insur-
ance. For example, a corporation in ﬁnancial distress stands a better chance to go bankrupt. Given
that a bankrupt ﬁrm cannot honor its promise to ﬁnancially support its managers’ legal fees in
the event of a lawsuit, the potential loss borne by the managers should increase as a corporation
ﬁnds itself in ﬁnancial distress. We will use minus the log of the asset-to-debt ratio divided by the
standard error of the stock’s daily return over the previous year as our measure of ﬁnancial distress
(Distress). This variable measures the probability that a put option on the corporation’s assets
will be exercised at a strike price equal to the book value of debt. To capture more precisely the
role and the risk associated with debt, we will use the pure debt ratio (DebtRatio)m e a s u r e da st h e
book value of debt divided by market value of equity. This variable is traditionally used to measure
the credit risk of a corporation. Our hypothesis is that the higher the ratio, the more likely will
ﬁnancial problems arise. Thus the pure debt ratio should be positively related to the frequency of
litigation.
9Finally, the litigation environment should have an important impact on the need for D&O
insurance. According to Core (1997), lawsuits against managers are more costly and more frequent
in the United States than in Canada. The laws governing corporations in the United States allow
more lawsuits than the laws governing Canadian corporations. Moreover, the jurisprudence in the
United States is such that lawsuits are very common; this is not the case in Canada where lawsuits
are not considered a normal business expense for corporations. The probability of litigation is
therefore higher for ﬁrms that are listed in both the United States and Canada as opposed to ﬁrms
listed in Canada only (USListing). Although it is true that sexual harassment and/or employment
discrimination suits against managers fall under the D&O coverage, most lawsuits are brought by
stockholders under the diﬀerent security laws. We therefore believe that a pure dichotomous variable
is suﬃcient to measure the exposure to litigation risk outside Canada.8
2.2.3 The Governance
D&O insurance may be considered part of the overall compensation package of managers. Instead
of receiving insurance coverage managers could instead opt for greater compensation. This means
that all aspect of corporate governance should have an impact on the demand for D&O insurance.
For example, litigation frequency should be smaller when managers are overseen more closely by
the board of directors.
To control for corporate governance, we will use ﬁve variables. Our ﬁrst variable is the pro-
portion of outsiders (Outsiders)o nt h eb o a r do fd i r e c t o r s .W ed e ﬁne as an external member any
person that is not the chief executive oﬃcer, the chairman of the board, an oﬃcer of the corporation,
an employee of the corporation or a member of their family. We hypothesize that the greater the
proportion of outside members on the board, the more closely will the board oversee the behavior
of managers. Possible mistakes by managers should therefore be prevented with greater ease, thus
litigation less likely.
Whether a single person holds both titles of chief executive oﬃcer and chairman of the board
(CEO = COB)i si m p o r t a n ta si tm a k e st h eb o a r dl e s si n d e p e n d e n t ,w h i c hm e a n st h a tl i t i g a t i o n
8A second litigation measure that could also be used is whether the ﬁrm faced litigation in the past. According to
Romano (1991) and Core (2000) ﬁrms that have faced litigation in that past are more likely to face litigation in the
future. A possible explanation is that plaintiﬀ lawyers who incurred important sunk costs in acquiring information
related to the inner working of the corporation (full disclosure of the information related to the case) may be inclined
to recoup those costs by suing the corporation more often. The problem with this measure is that it is often not
disclosed in annual statements, and if it is, they are only for those lawsuits that are expected to be paid in the future
and for which the corporation needs to make provisions.
10should be more likely because the decisions of the CEO are less closely monitored. This variable is
dichotomous, taking the value one when the one persons holds both positions.
Another important aspect of corporate governance is whether there are block holders in the
corporation. Contrary to the United States where all stockholders that own more than 5% of the
outstanding stock must be listed as such, Canadian corporations only need to report stockholders
that own more than 10%. To control not only for block holders, but also their relationship with the
corporation’s managers, we constructed three control variables. First, we calculated the ownership
percentage (votes9) of the chief executive oﬃc e r ,t h ec h a i r m a no ft h eb o a r da n dt h e i ri m m e d i a t e
family (CEOVotes). The more votes held by these managers directly or indirectly, the more
likely a corporation will purchase insurance since the managers do not need to answer for their
behavior as much as in corporations where the CEO has less voting power. Second, we calculated
the ownership percentage (votes) of external entities that own blocks. This variable includes both
individual external stock holders as well as important interest of other non-ﬁnancial corporations
(OutVotes). External block holders have the ability to oversee the behavior of managers, which
reduces the likelihood of mistakes by managers and thus the need for insurance. Our third variable
is the percentage of votes held by ﬁnancial groups (FinVotes). As for the percentage of votes held
by outsiders, we expect more monitoring of managers as ﬁnancial groups have more power, thus
reducing the need for insurance.
Our last corporate governance variable will be the board member’s interest (in market value)
in the corporation as a proportion of total book equity (BoardWealth). Board members that have
more invested in the corporation will oversee operations more closely, thus reducing the need for
insurance. Also, wealth can be seen as a proxy for risk aversion. If boardmembers’ utility is such
that the third derivative with respect to wealth is positive - a less binding constraint than the
normally assumed non-increasing risk aversion - then the more equity owned by boardmembers of
the ﬁrm the less risk averse they should be. All else being equal, less risk averse individuals are
less likely to purchase insurance. We therefore expect BoardWealth to have a negative impact on
D&O insurance purchase.
9Canadian law allows very openly the distribution of multiple-voting shares. It becomes important to make a
diﬀerence between the percentage of votes and the percentage of value of the diﬀerent stakeholders in the corporation.
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Table 2 summarizes the explanatory variables used, the expected sign on the likelihood that a ﬁrm
purchased D&O insurance and their summary statistics. We see that almost 70 % of the ﬁrms in
our sample purchased D&O insurance. The average size of these corporations is almost the same
whether we consider the log of total assets or the log of the market value of equity. About 10%
of the ﬁrms are listed in the United States. In close to 44 % of the cases the chief executive oﬃcer
is also the chairman of the board. On average, the CEO holds 19 % of the voting shares, which
is more than the average block holding of ﬁrm outsiders which stands at 16 %. An interesting
statistic is that on average the value of the board members’ holding hold about 23 % of the ﬁrm’s
book equity.
Table 3 presents the results of the probit regressions. The regression results presented in the
columns labelled ModelA1 and ModelA2 do not consider the fact that some exogenous variables
are highly correlated, such as the size of the corporation as measured by the log of assets or the
log of the market value of equity. In ModelA2 we include time and sector ﬁxed eﬀects to control
for time speciﬁc and sector speciﬁc shocks. In the last two models we control for the correlation
between the variables. In ModelA3, we correct for the correlation between the ﬁrst seven variables
(LnAssets, LnMVE, Volatility, ROA, Distress, DERatio and USlisted). In ModelA4, we control for
all the correlation. Our main results are more or less robust to the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Our
discussion will mainly focus on ModelA4.
It appears that larger corporations are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, and that the
most important measure of size when D&O insurance is concerned is the value of the corporation’s
assets. The market value of equity seemed to be important only when we did not control for time
or sector eﬀects. As soon as we control for these ﬁxed eﬀects this variable is no longer signiﬁcant.
A results that is consistent in the four model speciﬁcations is the volatility measure. It appears
the greater the volatility of the stock price the less likely are corporations to purchase insurance.
This supports our contention that the more volatile the stock price, the easier it is for managers to
hide their incompetence behind the veil of investor sentiment. As manager actions are hidden from
view, they do not need insurance as much. Thus they are less eager to demand insurance coverage.
A corporation’s return of assets (ROA) also has a negative impact on the likelihood of purchasing
D&O insurance. The logic is that as accounting returns are high, it is either less likely that managers
12will get sued because the ﬁrm is performing well (since stockholders are the main source of lawsuits),
or the ﬁrm is less likely to ﬁnd itself in a position that it will not be able to compensate the managers
for their legal bill. As such it is logical to observe ﬁrms with a higher measure of performance to be
less likely to purchase D&O insurance than ﬁrms whose accounting returns are low. The same logic
applies to the measure of ﬁnancial distress used in this paper. As ﬁr m se n t e rp e r i o d so fﬁnancial
distress, managers are more likely to demand D&O insurance protection in the more likely event
that the ﬁrm goes into bankruptcy and is unable to compensated the manager for their legal bill.
Surprisingly, and contrary to what Core (1997, 2000) found, the fact that a corporation is listed
on a U.S. stock exchange does not seem to have an impact on the demand for D&O insurance
(except when we do not control for ﬁxed eﬀects or correlation). We expected ﬁrms that were listed
in the U.S. to be more likely to purchase insurance as the U.S. business environment is much more
litigious than the Canadian business environment. Our empirical ﬁndings indicate that this is not
the case. One possibility is that it is larger corporations that are stock cross-listed in the United
States. As such the U.S. business environment is controlled for using assets. Although it appears
from ModelA1 that ﬁrms listed in the U.S. are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, it did
n o tc o n t r o lf o rt i m eo rs e c t o re ﬀects. As we control for theses eﬀects, the signiﬁcance of being
cross-listed in the U.S. disappears (as the market value of equity did).
When we look at board composition, we observe that only two measures are signiﬁcant: The
proportion of outsiders on the board of directors and the importance of ﬁnancial institution stock
votes ownership. In the two cases the impact is negative, which suggests that the greater the
proportion of outsiders on the board, and the greater ﬁnancial institution ownership, the less likely
are corporation to have D&O insurance. A possibility is that ﬁrms feel that the greater the number
of outsiders, the more likely they are to oversee closely the behavior of managers, and thus the less
likely are managers to err by mistake. The same logic applies to ﬁnancial institution, who also are
perhaps able to back ﬁnancially ﬁrms in which their implication is important in case such ﬁrms are
faced with D&O litigation. CEO power, as measured by whether the CEO is also the chairman
of the board and the stock ownership votes of the CEO, does not seem to have an impact on the
likelihood of purchasing D&O insurance.
The last variable of interest if the wealth of the corporate board members in the corporation.
As the board owns more wealth in the corporation, the corporation is less likely to purchase D&O
insurance. One possible explanation is similar to that of outside board presence: Board members
13who have more to lose verify more closely the behavior of corporate oﬃcers. Another explanation
is that wealthier boards are less risk averse, which reduces their demand for D&O insurance, and
thus the likelihood that a corporation will purchase D&O insurance.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper was to further our understanding of the corporate demand for insurance. To
do so we analyzed the determinants of the demand for insurance of corporate managers as part of
their function within the corporation. Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ liability insurance protects managers
against lawsuits brought onto them as representative of the corporation. Corporation can buy
insurance coverage to compensate their managers in the event of losses arising from such lawsuits.
In this paper we analyzed the purchase by a corporation of Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ insurance.
Our results indicate that size is an important factor in the decision to purchase insurance. It
appears that larger corporation are more likely to have D&O insurance, contrary to Stulz (1996)
assertion. Interestingly, size is an important factor only when it is measured as the value of the
assets; the market value of equity does not seem to have any bearing on the decision to purchase
insurance. Basic measures of ﬁnancial health also have an important impact on the decision to
have D&O insurance as ﬁrms that have a high return on assets as well as a low measure of ﬁnancial
distress are less likely to purchase D&O insurance. A large stock volatility reduces the likelihood of
purchasing insurance. Finally, board composition and wealth is an important factor contributing
to the decision to purchase D&O insurance. As the personal wealth of directors increases and
as the proportion of outside members on the board increases, the ﬁrm is less likely to purchase
D&O insurance, perhaps because these board members supervise more closely the oﬃcers of the
corporation, including the CEO.
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166 Appendix: Tables
Table 1.N u m b e ro fﬁrms per year by economic sector.
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Sector % of total
Biophamaceutical 4 9 10 13 19 19 165 . 8 3
Forest and Paper 192 73 1 32 29 29 25 12.11
Industrial Products 30 63 79 82 83 80 64 30.18
Technological 5 152 1 28 37 36 33 11.04
Consumer Products 21 38 44 47 48 48 37 11.75
C & I P r o d u c t s 45988873 . 0 7
Merchandizing 152 73 33 63 52 92 312.42
Media 9 18 21 22 17 17 17 7.56
Total 107 202 248 268 276 266 222 1594








Insurance 0.6939 0.4610 0 1
Assets + 5.2270 1.7707 0.1044 10.998
MVE + 5.000 1.8708 -0.3320 16.260
ROA - 0.0162 0.1478 -0.9939 1.9937
Volatility - 0.5157 0.3392 0.0298 4.1176
Distress + -0.2048 0.1975 -3.9898 0.1074
D/E Ratio + 1.3938 4.5580 0.0040 141.13
US Listed + 0.1028 0.3038 0 1
Outsiders - 0.6983 0.1448 0.1429 1
CEO=COB + 0.4390 0.4964 0 1
CEOVotes + 0.1934 0.2622 0 0.9840
OutVotes - 0.1623 0.2463 0 0.9940
FinVotes - 0.0948 0.1993 0 1.0000
BoardWealth - 0.2325 0.2610 0 2.3780
17Table 3. The Determinants of D&O Purchase
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the company had












































































































































Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES
Sector Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES
LL -949.34 -911.56 -906.25 -906.25
n 1585 1585 1585 1585
∗∗signiﬁcant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at the 1 % level. Standard error in parentheses.
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